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DEDICATION 
Those of us at NASA, who have worked incessantly 
since that day in January when the 
CHALLENGER and her crew, our friends, were 
lost, dedicate this report to those who will f l y  again 
into space in the future. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
June 13, 1986 
Dear Jim: 
I have completed my review of the report f r o m  the Commission 
on the Space Shuttle CHALLENGER Accident. I believe that 
a program must be undertaken to implement its recommenda- 
tions as soon as possible. The procedural and organizational 
changes suggested in the report will be essential to resuming 
effective and efficient Space Transportation System operations, 
and will be crucial in restoring U.S. space launch activities 
to full operational status. 
Specifically, I would like NASA to report back to m e  in 
30 days on how and when the Commission's recommendations 
w i l l  be implemented. 
by which progress in the implementation process can be 
measured. 
This report should include milestones 
Let me emphasize, as I have so many times, that the men 
and women of NASA and the tasks they so ably perform are 
essential to the nation if we are to retain our leadership 
in the pursuit of technological and scientific progress. 
Despite misfortunes and setbacks, we are determined to press 
on in our space programs. Again, J i m ,  we  turn to you for 
leadership. You and the NASA team have our support and 
our blessings to do what has to be done to make our space 
program safe, reliable, and a source of pride to our nation 
and of benefit to all mankind. 
I look forward to receiving your report on implementing the 
Commission's recommendations. 
The Honorable James C. Fletcher 
Administrator 
National Aeronautics and 
Washington, D. C . 20546 Space Administration 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Office of the Administrator 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, DC 20500 
Dear Mr. President: 
I am pleased to  submit the NASA plan to implement the recommendations of the 
Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. The Commission has 
rendered the nation an exceptional service in conducting a comprehensive and thorough 
investigation. NASA agrees with the recommendations and is vigorously implementing 
them. 
An overview of our efforts, the milestones by which we will  measure our progress, 
and a detailed response to the specific Commission recommendations are provided in the 
enclosed report. A status report on our implementation program will be submitted in 
June 1987. 
The men and women of NASA appreciate your continued personal support. 
Enclosure 
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On June 13, 1986, the President directed 
NASA to implement, as soon as possible, 
the recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challeng- 
er Accident. The President requested that 
NASA report, within 30 days, how and 
when the recommendations will be imple- 
mented, including milestones by which 
progress can be measured. 
In the months since the Challenger acci- 
dent, the NASA team has spent many hours 
in support of the Presidential Commission 
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 
and in planning for a return of the Shuttle 
to safe flight status. Chairman William P. 
Rogers and the other members of the Com- 
mission have rendered the Nation and 
NASA an exceptional service. The work of 
the Commission was extremely thorough 
and comprehensive. NASA agrees with the 
Commission’s recommendations and is vig- 
orously pursuing the actions required to im- 
plement and comply with them. 
As a result of the efforts in support of the 
Commission, many of the actions required 
to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight 
status have been under way since March. 
On March 24, 1986, the Associate Adminis- 
trator for Space Flight outlined a compre- 
hensive strategy, and defined major actions, 
for safely returning to flight status. The 
March 24 memorandum (Appendix A) 
provided guidance on the following 
subjects: 
actions required prior to next flight, 
first flighdfirst year operations, and 
development of sustainable safe flight 
The Commission report was submitted to 
the President on June 9, 1986. Since that 
time, NASA has taken additional actions 
and provided direction required to comply 
with the Commission’s recommendations 
(Appendix B). A summary of the key mile- 
stones is included at the end of the Execu- 
tive Summary. 
The NASA Administrator and the Associate 
Administrator for Space Flight will partici- 
rate. 
pate in the key management decisions re- 
quired for implementing the Commission 
recommendations and for returning the 
Space Shuttle to flight status. NASA will re- 
port to the President on the status of the 
implementation program in June 1987. 
The Commission report included nine rec- 
ommendations, and a summary of the im- 
plementation status for each is provided: 
~ ~~ 
Recommendation I 
Solid Rocket Motor Design: On March 24, 
1986, the Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC) was directed to form a Solid Rocket 
Motor (SRM) joint redesign team to include 
participation from MSFC and other NASA 
centers as well as individuals from outside 
NASA. The team includes personnel from 
Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space 
Center, Langley Research Center, industry, 
and the Astronaut Office. To assist the 
redesign team, an expert advisory panel was 
appointed which includes 12 people with six 
coming from outside NASA. 
The team has evaluated several design alter- 
natives, and analysis and testing are in 
progress to determine the preferred ap- 
proaches which minimize hardware rede- 
sign. To ensure adequate program contin- 
gency in this effort, the redesign team will 
also develop, at least through concept defi- 
nition, a totally new design which does not 
utilize existing hardware. The design verifi- 
cation and certification program will be 
emphasized and will include tests which du- 
plicate the actual launch loads as closely as 
feasible and provide for tests over the full 
range of operating conditions. The verifica- 
tion effort includes a trade study which has 
been under way for several weeks to deter- 
mine the preferred test orientation (vertical 
or horizontal) of the full-scale motor firings. 
The Solid Rocket Motor redesign and certi- 
fication schedule is under review to fully 
understand and plan for the implementa- 
tion of the design solutions as they are final- 
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ized and assessed. The schedule will be re- 
assessed after the SRM Preliminary Design 
Review in September 1986. At this time it 
appears that the first launch will not occur 
prior to the first quarter of 1988. 
Independent Oversight: In accordance with 
the Commission’s recommendation, the Na- 
tional Research Council (NRC) has estab- 
lished an Independent Oversight Group 
chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever and re- 
porting to the NASA Administrator. The 
NRC Oversight Group has been briefed on 
Shuttle system requirements, implementa- 
tion, and control; Solid Rocket Motor back- 
ground; and candidate modifications. The 
group has established a near-term plan that 
includes briefings and visits to review in- 
flight loads; assembly processing; redesign 
status; and other solid rocket motor de- 
signs, including the Titan. Longer term 
plans are being formulated by the group in- 
cluding participation in the Solid Rocket 
Motor preliminary design review in Sep- 
tember 1986. 
Recommendation I1 
Shuttle Management Structure: The Adminis- 
trator has appointed General Sam Phillips, 
who served as Apollo Program Director, to 
study every aspect of how NASA manages 
its programs, including relationships be- 
tween various field centers and NASA 
Headquarters. General Phillips has broad 
authority from the Administrator to ex- 
plore every aspect of NASA organization, 
management and procedures. His activities 
will include a review of the Space Shuttle 
management structure. 
On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 
Crippen was directed to form a fact-finding 
group to assess the Space Shuttle manage- 
ment structure. The group will report rec- 
ommendations to the Associate Administra- 
tor for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 
Specifically, this group will address the roles 
and responsibilities of the Space Shuttle 
Program Manager to assure that the posi- 
tion has the authority commensurate with 
its responsibilities. In addition, roles and re- 
sponsibilities at all levels of program man- 
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agement will be reviewed to specify the rela- 
tionship between the program organization 
and the field center organizations. The re- 
sults of this study will be reviewed with Gen- 
eral Phillips and the Administrator with a 
decision on implementation of the recom- 
mendations by October 1, 1986. 1 
Astronauts in Management: Rear Admiral 
Richard Truly, a former astronaut, has 
been appointed as Associate Administrator 
for the Office of Space Flight. Several active 
astronauts are currently serving in manage- 
ment positions in the agency. The Crippen 
group will address means to stimulate the 
transition of astronauts into other manage- i 
ment positions. It will also determine the 
appropriate position for the Flight Crew 
I 
I 
Operations Directorate within the NASA 
organizational structure. 
Shuttle Safety Panel: A Shuttle Safety Panel 
will be established by the Associate Admin- 
istrator for Space Flight not later than Sep- 
tember 1, 1986, with direct access to the 
Space Shuttle Program Manager. This date 
allows time to determine the structure and 
function of this panel, including an assess- 
ment of its relationship to the newly formed 
Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality As- 
surance, and to the existing Aerospace Safe- 
ty Advisory Panel. 
Recommendation I11 
Critical Item Review and Hazard Analysis: On 
March 13, 1986, NASA initiated a complete 
review of all Space Shuttle program failure 
modes and effects analyses (FMEA’s) and 
associated critical item lists (CIL‘s). Each 
Space Shuttle project element and associat- 
ed prime contractor is conducting separate 
comprehensive reviews which will culminate 
in a program-wide review with the Space 
Shuttle Program Manager at Johnson 
Space Center later this year. Technical 
specialists from outside the Space Shuttle 
program have been assigned as formal 
members of each of these review teams. All 
Criticality 1 and 1R critical item waivers 
have been cancelled. The teams are re- 
quired to reassess and resubmit waivers in 
categories recommended for continued 
program applicability. Items which cannot 
I 
i 
I 
i 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
be revalidated will be redesigned, qualified, 
and certified for flight. All Criticality 2 and 
3 CIL’s are being reviewed for reacceptance 
and proper categorization. This activity will 
culminate in a comprehensive final review 
with NASA Headquarters beginning in 
March 1987. 
As recommended by the Commission, the 
National Research Council has agreed to 
form an Independent Audit Panel, report- 
ing to the NASA Administrator, to verify 
the adequacy of this effort. 
Since this recommendation is closely linked 
with the recommendation on Shuttle man- 
agement structure, the study team will in- 
corporate the plan for improved communi- 
cations with that for management restruc- 
ture. 
This review of effective communications 
will consider the activities and information 
flow at NASA Headquarters and the field 
centers which support the Shuttle program. 
The study team will present findings and 
recommendations to the Associate Adminis- 
trator for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 
Recommendation IV 
Safety Organization: The NASA Administra- 
tor announced the appointment of Mr. 
George A. Rodney to the position of Associ- 
ate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, 
and Quality Assurance on July 8, 1986. The 
responsibilities of this office will include the 
oversight of safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance functions related to all NASA ac- 
tivities and programs and the implementa- 
tion of a system for anomaly documentation 
and resolution to include a trend analysis 
program. One of the first activities to be un- 
dertaken by the new Associate Administra- 
tor will be an assessment of the resources 
including workforce required to ensure ad- 
equate execution of the safety organization 
functions. In addition, the new Associate 
Administrator will assure appropriate inter- 
faces between the functions of the new safe- 
ty organization and the Shuttle Safety Panel 
which will be established in response to the 
Commission Recommendation 11. 
~ ~ 
Recommendation V 
Improved Communications: On June 25, 1986, 
Astronaut Robert Crippen was directed to 
form a team to develop plans and recom- 
mended policies for the following: 
Implementation of effective management 
communications at all levels. 
Standardization of the imposition and re- 
moval of STS launch constraints and 
other operational constraints. 
Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and 
Mission Management Team meetings, in- 
cluding requirements for documentation 
and flight crew participation. 
Recommendation VI 
Landing Safety: A Landing Safety Team has 
been established to review and implement 
the Commission’s findings and recommen- 
dations on landing safety. All Shuttle hard- 
ware and systems are undergoing design 
reviews to insure compliance with the 
specifications and safety concerns. The 
tires, brakes, and nose wheel steering sys- 
tem are included in this activity, and fund- 
ing for a new carbon brakes system has 
been approved. Runway surface tests and 
landing aid requirement reviews had been 
under way for some time prior to the acci- 
dent and are continuing. Landing aid im- 
plementattion will be complete by July 
1987. The interim brake system will be 
delivered by August 1987. Improved 
methods of local weather forecasting and 
weather-related support are being devel- 
oped. Until the Shuttle program has dem- 
onstrated satisfactory safety margins 
through high fidelity testing and during ac- 
tual landings at Edwards Air Force Base, 
the Kennedy Space Center landing site will 
not be used for nominal end-of-mission 
landings. Dual Orbiter ferry capability has 
been an issue for some time and will be 
thoroughly considered during the upcom- 
ing months. 
Recommendation VI1 
Launch Abort and Crew Escape: On April 7, 
1986, NASA initiated a Shuttle Crew Egress 
and Escape review. The scope of this analy- 
sis includes egress and escape capabilities 
from launch through landing and will 
provide analyses, concepts, feasibility assess- 
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ments, cost, and schedules for pad abort, 
bailout, ejection systems, water landings, 
and powered flight separation. This review 
will specifically assess options for crew es- 
cape during controlled gliding flight and 
options for extending the intact abort flight 
envelope to include failure of 2 or 3 main 
engines during the early ascent phase. In 
conjunction with this activity, a Launch 
Abort Reassessment Team was established 
to review all launch and launch abort rules 
to ensure that launch commit criteria, flight 
rules, range safety systems and procedures, 
landing aids, runway configurations and 
lengths, performance versus abort expo- 
sure, abort and end-of-mission landing 
weights, runway surfaces, and other land- 
ing-related capabilities provide the proper 
margin of safety to the vehicle and crew. 
Crew escape and launch abort studies will 
be complete on October 1, 1986, with an 
implementation decision in December 1986. 
Recommendation VI11 
Flight Rate: In March 1986 NASA estab- 
lished a Flight Rate Capability Working 
Group. Two flight rate capability studies are 
under way: (1) a study of capabilities and 
constraints which govern the Shuttle proc- 
essing flows at the Kennedy Space Center 
and (2) a study by the Johnson Space Cen- 
ter to assess the impact of flight specific 
crew training and software delivery/ 
certification on flight rates. The working 
group will present flight rate recommenda- 
tions to the Office of Space Flight by Au- 
gust 15, 1986. Other collateral studies are 
still in progress which address Presidential 
Commission recommendations related to 
spares provisioning, maintenance, and 
structural inspection. This effort will also 
consider the National Research Council in- 
dependent review of flight rate which is 
under way as a result of a Congressional 
Subcommittee request. 
NASA strongly supports a mixed fleet to 
satisfy launch requirements and actions to 
revitalize the United States expendable 
launch vehicle capabilities. 
Additionally, a new cargo manifest policy is 
being formulated by NASA Headquarters 
4 
which will establish manifest ground rules 
and impose constraints to late changes. 
Manifest control policy recommendations 
will be completed in November 1986. 
Recommendation IX 
Maintenance Safeguards: A Maintenance 
Safeguards Team has been established to 
develop a comprehensive plan for defining 
and implementing actions to comply with 
the Commission recommendations concern- 
ing maintenance activities. A Maintenance 
Plan is being prepared to ensure that uni- 
form maintenance requirements are im- 
posed on all elements of the Space Shuttle 
program. This plan will define the structure 
that will be used to document (1) hardware 
inspections and schedules, (2) planned 
maintenance activities, (3) maintenance pro- 
cedures configuration control, and (4) 
maintenance logistics. The plan will also de- 
fine organizational responsibilities, report- 
ing, and control requirements for Space 
Shuttle maintenance activities. The mainte- 
nance plan will be completed by September 
30, 1986. 
A number of other activities are underway 
which will contribute to a return to safe 
flight and strengthening the NASA organi- 
zation. A Space Shuttle Design 
Requirements Review Team headed by the 
Space Shuttle Systems Integration Office at 
Johnson Space Center has been assigned to 
review all Shuttle design requirements and 
associated technical verification. The team 
will focus on each Shuttle project element 
and on total Space Shuttle system design re- 
quirements. This activity will culminate in a 
Space Shuttle Incremental Design Certifica- 
tion Review approximately 3 months prior 
to the next Space Shuttle launch. 
In consideration of the number, complexi- 
ty, and interrelationships between the many 
activities leading to the next flight, the 
Space Shuttle Program Manager at Johnson 
Space Center has initiated a series of formal 
Program Management Reviews for the 
Space Shuttle program. These reviews are 
structured to be regular face-to-face discus- 
sions involving the managers of all major 
Space Shuttle program activities. Specific 
subjects to be discussed at each meeting will 
focus on progress, schedules, and actions 
associated with each of the major program 
review activities and will be tailored directly 
to current program activity for the time pe- 
riod involved. The first of these meetings 
was held at Marshall Space Flight Center on 
May 5-6, 1986, with the second at Kennedy 
Space Center on June 25, 1986. Follow-on 
reviews will be held approximately every 6 
weeks. Results of these reviews will be re- 
ported to the Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight and to the NASA Administra- 
tor. 
On June 19, 1986, the NASA Administrator 
announced termination of the development 
of the Centaur upper stage for use aboard 
the Space Shuttle. Use of the Centaur 
upper stage was planned for NASA plane- 
tary spacecraft launches as well as for cer- 
tain national security satellite launches. Ma- 
jor safety reviews of the Centaur system 
were under way at the time of the Challeng- 
er accident, and these reviews were intensi- 
fied in recent months to determine if the 
program should be continued. The final de- 
cision to terminate the Centaur stage for 
use with the Shuttle was made on the basis 
that even following certain modifications 
identified by the ongoing reviews, the re- 
sultant stage would not meet safety criteria 
being applied to other cargo or elements of 
the Space Shuttle system. NASA has initiat- 
ed efforts to examine other launch vehicle 
alternatives for the major NASA planetary 
and scientific payloads which were sched- 
uled to utilize the Centaur upper stage. 
NASA is providing assistance to the Depart- 
ment of Defense as it examines alternatives 
for those national security missions which 
had planned to use the ShuttleKentaur. 
The NASA Administrator has announced a 
number of Space Station organizational and 
management structural actions designed to 
strengthen technical and management capa- 
bilities in preparation for moving into the 
development phase of the Space Station 
program. The decision to create the new 
structure is the result of recommendations 
made to the Administrator by a committee, 
headed by General Phillips, which is con- 
ducting a long range assessment of NASA’s 
overall capabilities and requirements. 
Finally, KASA is developing plans for in- 
creased staffing in critical areas and is work- 
ing closely with the Office of Personnel 
Management to develop a NASA specific 
proposal which would provide for needed 
changes to the NASA personnel manage- 
ment system to strengthen our ability to at- 
tract, retain, and motivate the quality work 
force required to conduct the NASA mis- 
sion (Appendix C). 
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of Presidential Commission 
Recommendations I - IX 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
- 1 -  
Design. The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and 
seal must be changed. This could be a new design 
eliminating the joint or a redesign of the current 
joint and seal. No design options should be 
prernaturely precluded because of schedule, cost 
or reliance on existing hardware. All Solid Rocket 
Motor joints should satisfy the following 
requirements: 
rn The joints should be fully understood, tested 
rn The integrity of the structure and of the seals 
of all joints should be not less than that of the 
case walls throughout the design envelope. 
rn The integrity of the joints should be insensitive 
and verified. 
to: 
- Dimensional tolerances. 
- Transportation and handling. 
- Assembly procedures. 
- Inspection and test procedures. 
- Environmental effects. 
- Internal case operating pressure. 
- Recovery and reuse effects. 
-Flight and water impact loads. 
rn The certification of the new design should 
include: 
-Tests which duplicate the actual launch con- 
-Tests over the full range of operating con- 
rn Full consideration should be given to conduct- 
ing static firings of the exact flight configura- 
tion in a verticai attitude. 
Independent Oversight. The Administrator of 
NASA should request the National Research 
Council to form an independent Solid Rocket 
Motor design oversight committee to implement 
the Commission’s design recommendations and 
oversee the design effort. This committee should: 
rn Review and evaluate certification require- 
rn Provide technical oversight of the design, test 
program and certification. 
rn Report to the Administrator of NASA on the 
adequacy of the design and make appropriate 
recommendations. 
figuration as closely as possible. 
ditions, including temperature. 
ments. 
I 
I 
I - 
NASA has formed a Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Joint Redesign team at the Marshall Space 
Flight Center. This team includes personnel from several NASA Centers, industry, and the 
Astronaut Office. Their activities are being reviewed by a NASAhndustry advisory panel and 
an Independent Oversight Group from the National Research Council. 
The team has evaluated several design alternatives, and analysis and testing is in progress to 
determine the preferred approaches which minimize hardware redesign. In addition, an 
approach will be developed, at least through concept definition, for a new design which does 
not utilize existing hardware. The primary selection criteria will be development of an SRM 
joint design that is safe to fly. A secondary objective is to minimize schedule impact by use of 
existing hardware, if that can be done without compromising safety. 
Analysis and testing is being performed to support the design selection process and to ensure 
the adequacy of the verification and certification of the redesigned joint. The static test orienta- 
tion and configuration is being analyzed, and a proposed method is scheduled to be selected in 
July 1986. The Solid Rocket Motor redesign and certification schedule is under review to fully 
understand and plan for the implementation of the design solutions as they are finalized and 
assessed. 
11 
NASA Imdementation of Recommendation I 
1 
On March 24, 1986, the Marshall Space 
Flight Center was directed to form a Solid 
Rocket Motor Redesign Team to include 
participation from Marshall, other NASA 
Centers, and the Astronaut Office, as well 
as individuals from outside NASA. To assist 
the redesign team, an expert advisory panel 
was appointed which includes 12 people, 
with six coming from outside NASA. The 
redesign team was directed to review the 
Commission findings and recommendations 
and develop a plan to provide a Solid 
Rocket Motor that addresses all the criteria 
in the Commission recommendations. The 
primary objective of the redesign effort is to 
provide a Solid Rocket Motor with .field and 
nozzle joints that is safe to fly. A secondary 
objective will be to minimize the schedule 
impact by using existing hardware, if this 
can be done without compromising safety. 
To ensure adequate program contingency 
in this effort, the redesign group will also 
develop, at least through concept definition, 
a totally new design that does not utilize ex- 
isting hardware. Key program milestones 
have been established. Emphasis is being 
placed on the verification effort to ensure 
its adequacy. As one part of the verification 
plan, a trade study is being conducted be- 
tween vertical (nozzle up and down) and 
horizontal static tests to determine the 
preferred test firing orientation. 
At the request of the NASA Administrator. 
the National Research Council (NRC) has 
established an Independent Oversight 
Group chaired by Dr. H. Guyford Stever 
and reporting directly to the Administrator. 
The NRC Oversight Group has been 
briefed on Shuttle system requirements, im- 
plementation, and control; Solid Rocket 
Motor background; and candidate modifi- 
cations. The group has established a near- 
term plan that includes briefings and visits 
to review in-flight loads, assembly process- 
ing, redesign status, and other solid rocket 
motor designs, including the Titan. Longer 
term plans of the group are being formulat- 
ed. 
Many design alternatives have been evaluat- 
ed, analyses and tests have been conducted, 
12 
initial verification plans have been estab- 
lished, and overall schedules have been de- 
veloped. In parallel, major SRM subassem- 
blies and many critical processes have been 
reassessed, and efforts to determine those 
requiring additional review or modifications 
are in varying stages of maturity. 
The team has evaluated several design alter- 
natives and is conducting analyses and test- 
ing to determine the best approach which 
will utilize either existing hardware or mod- 
ification of that in the production flow. An 
alternate joint design that does not utilize 
existing hardware is also under way. Addi- 
tional design and studies are considering 
modifications to ground support equipment 
to resolve transportation, handling, and as- 
sembly difficulties encountered in the past, 
as well as ground and flight systems to com- 
pensate for the environmental effects of 
temperature and inclement weather. Other 
design modifications to reduce criticality or 
to resolve prior difficulties relating to the 
ignition system, factory joints, and nozzle 
are being considered. Design solutions for 
these modifications have been identified, 
and programmatic assessments are being fi- 
nalized. 
Analyses and tests have been performed to 
support design selection. The analyses re- 
late to structural strength, dimensional tol- 
erances, gas and thermal dynamics, elasto- 
meric material behavior, and leak check ad- 
equacy. Tests being conducted range from 
small scale cold gas O-ring performance 
tests, to 70 pound motor hot gas insulation 
evaluation, to full size joint mating tests 
evaluating assembly aids. Further, 
thoroughly comprehensive analyses are 
under way and planned that will be test- 
verified to fully understand the joint opera- 
tion. The total verification program com- 
prises analyses and an extensive test pro- 
gram using subscale fixtures, full-size mated 
segments subjected to hot gas transient 
motor pressure, full-size segment assembly 
demonstrations, and four full scale static 
hot firing tests that will be either horizontal, 
vertical, or a combination of both. The 
static test orientation is being fully ex- 
plored, and the preferred configuration is 
anticipated to be proposed in late July 1986. 
Two of these full-scale tests will contain all 
system changes. 
and plan for the implementation of the de- 
sign solutions as they are finalized and 
assessed. The schedule will be reassessed - 
after the Preliminary Design Review in 
September 1986. The Solid Rocket Motor design schedule is currently under review to fully understand 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
- I1 - 
Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle 
Program Structure should be reviewed. The proj- 
ect managers for the various elements of the Shut- 
tle program felt more accountable to their center 
management than to the Shuttle program organi- 
zation. Shuttle element funding, work package 
definition, and vital program information fre- 
quently bypass the National STS (Shuttle) Pro- 
gram Manager. 
A redefinition of the Program Manager’s respon- 
sibility is essential. This redefinition should give 
the Program Manager the requisite authority for 
all ongoing STS operations. Program funding 
and all Shuttle Program work at the centers 
should be placed clearly under the Program 
Manager’s authority. 
Astronauts in Management. The Commission 
observes that there appears to be a departure from 
the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating 
to the use of astronauts in management positions. 
These individuals brought to their positions flight 
experience and a keen appreciation of operations 
and flight safety. 
w NASA should encourage the transition of 
qualified astronauts into agency management 
positions. 
The function of the Flighi Crew Operations 
director should be elevated in the NASA orga- 
nization structure. 
Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an 
STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS 
Program Manager. The charter of this panel 
should include Shuttle operational issues, launch 
commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and 
risk management. The panel should include 
representation from the safety organization, mis- 
sion operations, and the astronaut office. 
NASA is reviewing all aspects of its management structure. The Administrator requested 
General Sam Phillips to return to NASA and review all aspects of the organizational manage- 
ment structure and procedural activities. This activity is currently in process and is expected to 
continue for several months. 
Astronaut Robert Crippen is leading a study addressing the STS management structure and 
the roles of astronauts in that structure. Specifically, the primary objective of the study is to 
strengthen the programmatic authority of STS management, and to clearly define the roles 
and responsibilities between the STS program and the NASA field centers. In addition, ways of 
encouraging astronauts to assume management positions will be identified as well as assessing 
their respective positions in the overall organizational structure. The results of this study will 
be thoroughly reviewed with General Phillips prior to incorporating the recommendations. 
A Shuttle Safety Panel with direct access to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight as well 
as the NSTS Program Manager will be established by September 1, 1986. The exact structure 
of this group and its relationship with other NASA safety organizations is currently under 
study. 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation 11 
I NASA Administrator 
NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher 
has appointed General Sam Phillips, who 
served as Apollo Program Director, to study 
every aspect of how NASA manages its pro- 
grams, including relationships between the 
various centers and NASA Headquarters. 
General Phillips’ review is not limited to the 
Challenger accident and operates with 
broad authority from the Administrator to 
examine all aspects of NASA’s organization, 
management, and procedural activities. He 
will prcvide his findings and recommenda- 
tions to the Administrator by the end of 
1986. 
Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 
Crippen was directed to form a fact-finding 
group to assess the National Space Tram- 
portation System (NSTS) management 
structure including the Shuttle Program 
Manager’s responsibilities, use of astronauts 
in management positions, and the function- 
al location of the Flight Crew Operations 
Director in the organizational structure. 
The fact-finding group consists of  
Robert Crippen, Group Leader 
Richard Kohrs, Deputy Manager, NSTS 
Walter Williams, Special Assistant to the 
George Page, LSOC, Director of STS 
Office 
NASA Administrator 
Test Operations, Vandenberg Launch 
Site 
This group is supplemented by individuals 
representing each of the field center in- 
stitutions reporting to the Office of Space 
Flight: 
Andrew Pickett, Kennedy Space Center 
William Sneed, Marshall Space Flight 
Clifford Charlesworth, Johnson Space 
Roy Estess, National Space Technology 
Center 
Center 
Laboratories 
The group is interviewing individuals at 
various management levels representing the 
STS program, the field center institutions, 
NASA Headquarters, and the major Shuttle 
contractors. In addition, the group will in- 
terview former senior program officials to 
gain their perspective from past program 
experience. Finally, the group will review 
the findings and proposals with a private 
consulting firm that is recognized as knowl- 
edgeable in management techniques. 
As of this time, the group has completed in- 
terviews at the Marshall and Kennedy Space 
Flight Centers, with subsequent interview 
trips scheduled to the Johnson Space Cen- 
ter and various contractor locations. Presen- 
tations of findings and recommendations 
from this study will be presented to the As- 
sociate Administrator for Space Flight by 
August 15, 1986. The findings and recom- 
mendations will then be reviewed with the 
Administrator to insure that they are consis- 
tent with the overall recommendations be- 
ing developed by General Phillips. The Of- 
fice of Space Flight will then implement the 
recommendations as appropriate. 
Specifically, the Level I/II/III program 
management concept will be reevaluated 
with changes implemented to strengthen 
the structure and to reduce the potential 
for conflict between the program organiza- 
tion and the NASA institutional organiza- 
tions. In accordance with the Commission 
recommendations, strong consideration will 
be given to placing all Shuttle program 
funding and work at the centers under the 
Program Manager’s authority. 
In addition, means to implement the rec- 
ommended use of astronauts in manage- 
ment positions will be identified. There are 
astronauts or former astronauts in ten man- 
agement positions in the agency at this time, 
including the Associate Administrator for 
Space Flight. This brings the number of as- 
tronauts who have been included in man- 
agement positions during the Shuttle pro- 
gram to approximately thirty, of which half 
have been in positions outside the Flight 
Crew Operations Directorate. This process 
is expected to continue and to be strength- 
ened as the program management is re- 
structured after this review. 
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The Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight will form a Shuttle Safety Panel by 
September 1, 1986. This panel will have di- 
rect access to the Associate Administrator 
for Space Flight and to the NSTS Program 
Manager. A detailed study to define the 
roles and responsibilities and the staffing of 
this panel is currently under way. In partic- 
ular, the relationship to the newly formed 
Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality As- 
surance, as well as the independent Aero- 
space Safety Advisory Panel, must be 
assessed. 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
- I11 - 
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. 
NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors 
should review all Criticality 1, lR ,  2, and 2R 
items and hazard analyses. This review should 
identify those items that must be improved prior 
to flight to ensure mission success and flight safe- 
ty. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National 
Research Council, should verify the adequacy of 
the effort and report directly to the Administrator 
of NASA. - 
I  NASA has initiated a review of all Space Shuttle Program Failure Modes and Effects Analyses, 
Critical Item Lists, and Hazard Analyses. Each Space Shuttle project element and its prime 
contractors are conducting independent reviews which will be integrated and assessed by the 
element project office. The results of these reviews and recommended actions will be provided 
to the NSTS Program Manager and to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight for final 
resolution. Technical specialists from outside the Space Shuttle program are assigned as for- 
mal members of each review team. The teams are reassessing all Criticality 1, lR, 2,2R, and 3 
items. All Criticality 1 and 1R critical item waivers have been cancelled and must be resubmit- 
ted for approval after these reviews. The National Research Council has agreed to establish an 
Audit Panel to verify the adequacy of this effort and to report to the NASA Administrator on 
its findings. 
I 
I 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation I11 
All STS project offices and element contrac- 
tors are required to review their hardware 
design to identify those systems or 
components which if they fail could present 
a risk to the safety of the crew or could re- 
sult in loss of the vehicle or mission. This is 
accomplished through a process defined in 
NASA Handbook 5300.4 and which re- 
quires the project to perform a Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and to 
develop a Critical Item List (CIL) and Haz- 
ard Analysis (HA) for each element. The 
purpose of the FMEA is to identify the vari- 
ous potential failure modes of the flight ele- 
ment components and assess the effects on 
the specific flight element as well as the total 
launch vehicle and mission. The potential 
failure modes are derived from analyses of 
function, design, and related manufactur- 
ing processes. The CIL identifies the critical 
failure modes and the rationale for reten- 
tion. The items contained in the CIL are 
classified in five major categories commen- 
surate with the degree of criticality. The 
five classifications of the CIL are as follows: 
1 
1R - Failure of both redundant hard- 
- Loss of life or vehicle 
ware elements could cause loss of 
life or vehicle 
2 - Loss of mission 
2R - Failure of both redundant hard- 
ware elements could cause loss of 
mission 
3 -Allothers 
The Hazard Analysis identifies the hazards 
and their status of resolution and catego- 
rizes them as controlled (by design, proce- 
dure, etc.) or as an accepted risk. Thi-s 
review process was conducted during the 
development phase of the STS program 
prior to the first flight and FMEA’s, CIL’s, 
and HA’s existed at the time of the 51-L 
launch. 
The Commission recommended that a 
reassessment of the FMEAKIL, in conjunc- 
tion with the hazard analyses, be conducted 
to assure that Criticality 1, 1 R, 2, and 2R 
items are reevaluated and that the hazard 
analyses properly identify the Criticality 1 
items. Thus, the associated risks and 
hazards will be thoroughly understood and 
appropriate action can be taken to minimize 
their criticality. NASA accepts this recom- 
mendation and the review is under way. 
The review was initiated by a March 13, 
1986, letter from the NSTS Program Man- 
ager to all project elements requesting that 
each office review its CIL’s and FMEA’s. 
The purpose of the review is to affirm the 
completeness and accuracy of each FMEAI 
CIL for the current NSTS design. The 
March 24, 1986, memorandum from the 
Associate Administrator for Space Flight 
defining the strategy for safely returning 
the Space Shuttle to flight status, directed 
that Criticality 1 and 1R items be subjected 
to a total review with a complete reapproval 
process implemented and that those items 
which were not revalidated must be rede- 
signed, certified, and qualified for flight. 
The memorandum also directed that all 
Criticality 2 and 3 CIL’s be reviewed for 
reacceptance and proper categorization. On 
March 28, 1986, the NSTS Manager signed 
Program Directive S400 19 which directed 
that all Criticality 1, lR, and payload safety 
waivers be reverified, signed, and resubmit- 
ted for approval. 
Following this direction, teams for each 
NSTS element project office (Level 111), in- 
cluding the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Ex- 
ternal Tank (ET), Space Shuttle Main En- 
gine (SSME), Orbiter, Government Fur- 
nished Equipment (GFE), Spacelab (SL), 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and Vanden- 
burg Launch Site (VLS), have been formed 
and are reviewing the FMEA’s, CIL’s, and 
HA’s which apply to their element hard- 
ware to assure that: 
a. The failure modes, causes, and related 
effects are identified and documented. 
b. The criticality has been properly 
assigned. 
c. The retention rationale for each criti- 
cal item is complete and accurate. 
The reviews are being conducted by techni- 
cal teams at the appropriate NASA centers 
and the element prime contractors. The re- 
sults of both reevaluations will be presented 
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to a Level I11 Configuration Control Board 
(CCB) Preboard which will review all NASA 
and contractor items and select those which 
require submittal to the Level I11 CCB for 
approval. The preboard will also review and 
recommend enhancements such as design 
and process changes, instrumentation and 
software additions, and testing or checkout 
changes which could be implemented to 
eliminate critical failure modes, reduce criti- 
cality, or minimize the possibility of failure 
or the effect of the failure. The preboard 
will select those items which should be sub- 
mitted to the Level I11 CCB for review. The 
pr-eboard m-embership will consist oft at a 
mimimum, the following members: 
a. NASA engineering management rep- 
b. Safety representative 
c. Reliability representative 
d. Astronaut Office representative 
e. Outside representative (not affiliated 
resentative 
with the NSTS). 
In addition to these project level reviews, 
selected independent contractors will review 
the ET, Orbiter, SRB, and SSME FMEA/ 
CIL’s and provide their assessment to the 
project manager. 
The Level I11 CCB will review the preboard 
data and submit those significant items, in- 
cluding proposed enhancements, to the 
Level I1 Program Requirements Change 
Board (PRCB) for consideration by the 
NSTS Program Manager. 
The element interface functional analysis is 
being reevaluated by the Systems Integra- 
tion contractor. After this systems integra- 
tion review, the results will be coordinated 
with the ET, Orbiter, SRB, and SSME Proj- 
ect Offices, and the coordinated results sub- 
mitted to the Level I1 Systems Integration 
Review Board. The results will then be pre- 
sented to the Level I1 PRCB for approval. 
The Level I1 PRCB, including membership 
from the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, 
will review the Level I11 CCB significant 
items, CIL changes, and enhancement rec- 
ommendations. The Level I1 PRCB may au- 
dit the enhancements not selected by Level 
111. The Level I1 PRCB will review and rec- 
ommend any CIL changes and enhance- 
ments to Level I NASA Headquarters for 
approval. A summary of disapproved CIL 
changes and enhancements will also be doc- 
umented and provided to Level I. 
To assist in this process, the NSTS Program 
Manager has instituted a Level I1 Overview 
Group to assure that prime contractor 
reviews are consistent and conform to the 
Level I1 FMENCIL reevaluation plan. The 
ET contractor, Martin Marietta Corpora- 
tion (MMC) at Michoud, was visited on June 
16-20, 1986, with satisfactory results. The 
Orbiter contractor, Rockwell International 
(RI) at Downey, CA, will be visited the week 
of July 14, 1986. Rocketdyne, Thiokol, 
United Space Boosters Inc. (USBI), and 
other prime contractors, will be visited in 
the following weeks. 
The Level I1 results and recommendations 
will be reviewed by Level I. The Level I 
board will be chaired by the NASA Associ- 
ate Administrator for Space Flight and con- 
sist of his designated representatives. Level 
I will approve all items on the revalidated 
Criticality 1 and 1R CIL lists. 
The overall reevaluation is planned to occur 
incrementally and is scheduled to continue 
through mid-1987. Each project manager 
will forward the results of their integrated 
review through the management approval 
cycle as each subsystem is completed. Safety 
engineering will present the results of the 
hazard analysis reevaluation to the Level I11 
CCB, the Senior Safety Review Board, the 
Level I1 PRCB for approval, and NASA 
Headquarters for review. 
The Commission recommended that the 
National Research Council (NCR) appoint 
an Audit Panel to verify the adequacy of 
this effort and report directly to the Admin- 
istrator of NASA. This request has been 
made by NASA and accepted by the NRC. 
The NRC is forming the panel and NASA 
will support them as required. 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
- IV - 
Safety Organization. NASA should establish an The responsibilities of this office should include: 
Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality rn The safety, reliability and quality assurance 
functions as they relate to all NASA activities Assurance to be headed by an Associate Ad- ministrator, reporting directly to the NASA Ad- and programs. ministrator. It would have direct authority for 
safety, reliability, and quality assurance rn Direction of reporting and documentation of 
throughout the agency. The  office should be problems, problem resolution and trends 
assigned the work force to ensure adequate over- 
sight of its.functions and should be independent 
of other NASA functional and program 
responsibilities. 
associated with flight safety. 
On July 8, 1986, NASA'Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher announced the appointment of 
Mr. George A. Rodney to the position of Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance. In this position Mr. Rodney will have overall responsibility for develop- 
ment and oversight of all Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance functions within NASA. In 
addition, he will assume the responsibility of implementing a system for anomaly documenta- 
tion and resolution to include a trend analysis program. 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation IV 
A NASA Office of Safety, Reliability, and 
Quality Assurance (SR8cQA) headed by an 
Associate Administrator and reporting 
directly to the NASA Administrator has 
been established. This position will be re- 
sponsible for the oversight of safety, relia- 
bility, and quality assurance functions relat- 
ed to all NASA activities and programs. In 
addition, it will be responsible for the direc- 
tion of reporting and documentation of 
problems, problem resolution, and trends 
associated with safety. 
Specifically, this office will be responsible 
for: 
a. Establishment and implementation of 
agency SR&QA policies, plans, and 
procedures. 
b. Insuring that risks are minimized by 
engineering design and operating 
procedures. 
c. Investigation of and reporting on all 
NASA mishaps, incidents, and 
accidents. 
d. Implementing a trend analysis pro- 
gram that includes accurate reporting 
of anomalies, analysis and testing of 
problems, and implementation of cor- 
rective measures. 
e. Ensuring that SR8cQA issues are fully 
considered at all design, flight, and 
test readiness reviews. 
f. Ensuring that all NASA SR8cQA 
organizations are adequately staffed 
with qualified personnel. 
g. Maintaining an effective dynamic safe- 
ty program. 
h. Providing an integrated focus for 
agencywide program assurance 
policies. 
. 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
-v- 
Improved Communications. The Commission 
found that Marshall Space Flight Center project 
managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to 
A policy should be developed which governs 
the imposition and removal of Shuttle launch 
constraints. 
management isolation, failed to provide full and 
timely information bearing on the safety of flight 
51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle program 
management. 
rn NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate 
this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center, 
whether by changes of personnel, organiza- 
tion, indoctrination or all three. 
Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission 
Management Team meetings should be 
recorded. 
The flight crew commander, or a designated 
representative, should attend the Flight 
Readiness Review, participate in acceptance 
of the vehicle for flight, and certify that the 
crew is properly prepared for flight. 
NASA is reviewing this recommendation as part of the review of the program management 
structure (Presidential Commission Recommendation 11). The results of this activity will be 
presented to the Associate Administrator for Space Flight by August 15, 1986. 
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~~ 
NASA Implementation of Recommendation V 
On June 25, 1986, Astronaut Robert 
Crippen was directed to form a team to 
develop plans and policies for the following: 
1. Implementation of effective manage- 
ment communication at all levels. 
2. Standardization of the imposition and 
removal of STS launch constraints and 
other operational constraints. 
3. Conduct of Flight Readiness Review and 
Mission Management Team meetings, in- 
cluding requirements for documentation 
and flight crew participation. 
Because this recommendation is closely 
linked with Recommendation 11, the study 
team will incorporate its plan for improved 
communications with that for the Shuttle 
management review. An integrated presen- 
tation of recommendations will be given to 
the Associate Administrator for Space 
Flight by August 15, 1986. 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
- VI - 
Landing Safety. NASA must take actions to im- 
prove landing safety. 
The tire, brake and nosewheel steering systems 
must be improved. These systems do not have 
sufficient safety margin, particularly at abort 
landing sites. 
The specific conditions under which planned 
landings at Kennedy would be acceptable 
should be ’ determined. Criteria must be 
established for tires, brakes and nosewheel 
steering. Until the systems meet those criteria 
in high fidelity testing that is verified at 
Edwards, landing at Kennedy should not be 
planned. 
m Committing to a specific landing site requires 
that landing area weather be forecast more 
than an hour in advance. During unpredict- 
able weather periods at Kennedy, program of- 
ficials should plan on Edwards landings. In- 
creased landings at Edwards may necessitate 
a dual ferry capability. 
NASA has established a Landing Safety Team to develop an implementation plan to comply 
with the Commission recommendation. Some improvements to the brakes and nosewheel 
steering systems had been made and other changes were under way prior to the accident. 
These planned improvements are being reassessed and additional changes are under consid- 
eration. Tire, brake, and runway surface tests are being conducted, and a plan to standardize 
landing aids and to install arresting barriers at all runways has been developed. An improved 
weather forecasting and reporting capability is being developed which will enhance the fore- 
casting of weather in support of launch and landing decisions. Planned end of mission land- 
ings at the Kennedy Space Center will occur only after adequate safety margins have been 
demonstrated by test and by landings at Edwards Air Force Base. 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation VI 
The NSTS Program Manager established a 
Landing Safety Team to review the Com- 
mission findings and recommendations on 
landing safety and to develop an implemen- 
tation plan to comply with the Commission 
recommendations. This effort will include: 
quired in tire, brake, nosewheel steer- 
ing, and other landing systems to as- 
sure safe operation; 
b. Development of a plan to implement 
the required improvements and to 
certify the overall landing system; 
c. Determination of landing criteria for 
all potential landing sites, nominal and 
contingency; 
d. Documentation of landing weather 
criteria for each site, taking local and 
seasonal variability and unpredict- 
ability into account. 
Until the program has demonstrated satis- 
factory safety margins through high fidelity 
testing and during actual landings at Ed- 
wards Air Force Base, the Kennedy landing 
site will not be used for nominal end-of- 
mission landings. 
Two brake improvement programs, a tire 
improvement study, a runway surface study 
and other hardware-related studies are 
under way. Design activities to improve the 
redundancy of the nosewheel steering sys- 
tem have been initiated. A plan to provide 
standard landing aids and other facilities in- 
cluding arresting barriers at all runways is 
being developed. An improved weather 
reporting capability is being developed 
which will enhance the weather forecasting 
in support of launch and landing decisions. 
The two brake improvement programs 
currently under way include: an interim en- 
ergy capability improvement to be imple- 
mented by first flight and a longer term car- 
bon brake development program. The in- 
terim modification includes addition of six 
hydraulic system orifices, an improved 
brake wear-in procedure, and a stiffer axle 
to correct the dynamic oscillation phenome- 
non seen on early flights. Also included are 
a pressure balance feature to evenly distrib- 
ute the energy load between inboard and 
a. Identification of improvements re- 
outboard brakes and a thicker stator which 
promises to improve energy absorption ca- 
pability. The long-term carbon brake pro- 
gram is planned to increase energy absorp- 
tion capability by 80- 100%. 
The objective of the tire improvement study 
and runway surface study is to determine 
how best to decrease the tire wear experi- 
enced during previous KSC landings and to 
improve crosswind landing capability. Addi- 
tionally, tests are planned at Wright Patter- 
son AFB to improve the ability to mathe- 
matically model tire side force characteris- 
tics in support of upcoming simulations. 
A major upgrade of the nosewheel steering 
system was accomplished prior to the STS 
61-A flight. The system to date has demon- 
strated improved handling qualities but it is 
still characterized by several single point 
failure modes. Two design activities are 
under way to improve redundancy: fail op- 
erational fail-safe avionics with the current 
single string hydraulic system and total fail- 
operational fail-safe nosewheel steering (in- 
cluding hydraulics). Either system will re- 
quire substantial software changes and pilot 
in-the-loop simulations for verification prior 
to flight test. Other hardware related 
studies in progress include tire blowout 
protection, autobraking, tire pressure in- 
strumentation, and anti-skid improvements. 
A thorough review (including clima- 
tological statistics) of the available runways 
in Europe and Africa has been accom- 
plished to assist in evaluating those runways 
which can improve Trans-Atlantic Abort 
Landing (TAL) safety margins. A site sur- 
vey team will look at four Moroccan run- 
ways in July. The findings of this team will 
be used to finalize the selection of a site and 
implement recommended improvements. 
In addition, a plan to provide standard 
landing aids and other facilities at all run- 
ways has been adopted. This plan includes 
the procurement of arresting barriers to 
provide safe stops in the event of brake fail- 
ures or unforecast wet runway conditions. A 
minimum weather reporting capability is 
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being developed which should ensure ac- 
ceptable weather for abort and end of mis- 
sion landings. 
The flight rules which govern the use of all 
landing sites, for both nominal and contin- 
gency situations, are being reevaluated. Dif- 
ferences in flight rules between nominal 
end-of-mission and abort landings may be 
necessary because of facility deficiencies at 
some abort landing sites; however, safety 
will not be significantly affected. This land- 
ing safety review process is an ongoing 
activity which will be refined as planned 
capabilities are implemented. 
Providing a dual Shuttle Carrier Aircraft 
(SCA) capability for the Orbiter has been a 
programmatic issue for some time. The 
plans for use of Edwards Air Force Base as 
the landing site until landing safety margins 
are improved, will increase the need for a 
dual ferry capability. This issue will be thor- 
oughly considered during the upcoming 
months. 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
NASA has initiated a review of the STS Crew EgressiEscape and launch abort capability. The 
crew EgresdEscape analysis is considering concepts for the total mission profile which includes 
pad activities, launch through flight to orbit, and descent from orbit to landing. To analyze 
each aspect of the mission, design teams for ground egress, bail-out ejection systems, water 
I - VI1 - 
Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The Shuttle 
program management considered first-stage abort 
options and crew escape options several times 
of limited utility, technical infeasibility, or pro- 
gram cost and schedule, no systems were im- 
plemented. The Commission recommends that 
NASA: 
Make all efforts to provide a crew escape 
system for use during controlled gliding flight. 
conditions under which an emergency runway 
landing can be successfully conducted in the 
event that two or three main engines fail early 
in ascent. 
during the history of the program, but because ' Make every effort to increase the range Of flight 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation VI1 
STS Crew Egress and Escape System.The 
NSTS Program Manager initiated a study 
effort in April of this year to consider all 
aspects of atmospheric crew escape from 
the time of crew ingress on the pad to post 
landing Orbiter egress. This study is being 
conducted by a team led by the Johnson 
Space Center Engineering Directorate with 
support from the Astronaut Office. Inputs 
have been solicited and received from es- 
cape experts from the Navy and the Air 
Force as well as the Langley Research Cen- 
ter and the Kennedy Space Center. The 
team is reviewing past studies as well as new 
and innovative concepts. A review of the 
design ground rules confirmed that the 
Shuttle was designed for intact (runway 
landing) abort for the case of loss of thrust 
in one main engine. These analysis require- 
ments have been expanded to include two 
and three engine out cases. The number of 
crew that each concept could safely extract 
and the crew survival requirements will be 
identified. The Crew Escape study will be 
completed on October 1, 1986, with an im- 
plementation decision in December 1986. 
The current escape mode for other than in- 
tact abort is ditching. This study is empha- 
sizing creation of an alternative to ditching 
and to expanding the escape envelope. The 
study team will identify the maximum alti- 
tude of escape coverage for ascent, abort, 
and entry for each individual concept 
under consideration. Thermal protection, 
oxygen, and pressure suit requirements will 
be identified for the concepts covering the 
higher altitudes. 
The study effort is divided into teams cov- 
ering first stage powered ascent, ejection 
systems, bailout, ditching, and ground 
egress. Consistent envelopes and costing 
techniques are being used to insure uni- 
form assessment. Each team has derived 
several concepts and assessed the advant- 
ages, disadvantages, cost, and vehicle 
changes associated with each. 
The preliminary conclusions resulting from 
the study are as follows: 
0 No concept provides complete coverage 
of the flight envelope. 
Low-cost options provide less envelope 
coverage. 
0 More costly concepts severely impact per- 
formance capability due to additional 
weight. 
threatening and should be avoided, if 
possible. 
The preliminary recommendations of the 
study team are as follows: 
Initiate a study of manual and powered 
Ditching is unpredictable and life 
extraction bailout. Design goals should be 
early implementation, minimum weight, 
and maximum crew size. 
Initiate a long-range study for combina- 
tions of ejection seats and passenger 
com partmen ts. 
0 Continue ditching structural integrity 
studies and initiate crew simulation train- 
ing for ditching. 
aeroseparation during first stage (prior to 
SRB separation) flight. 
0 Flame protection should be provided for 
the launch pad access area, the hazardous 
gas detection system should be reviewed, 
and T V  coverage of the total crew egress 
route should be provided. 
0 Reanalyze the slide system from platform 
to basket to bunker to transport vehicle. 
0 Augment Orbiter post landing egress ca- 
pability with a slide. 
Assign a pad egress safety manager with 
overall pad egress safety responsibility. 
The preliminary recommendations are be- 
ing reviewed at this time, and hardware 
contractors will be requested to provide 
study plans, design proposals, and funding 
requirements for review by the NSTS Pro- 
gram Office prior to any final implementa- 
tion decision. 
0 Initiate a detailed feasibility study of 
LaunchlAbort Reassessment. A LaunchlAbort 
Reassessment Team was formed to perform 
a total review of the launch phase and abort 
options available within that phase. This 
team will insure that all available options to 
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provide emergency runway landing cap- 
ability are defined. These options will then 
be reviewed by the NSTS Program Manager 
prior to any implementation decisions being 
made. 
This team has been formed and is divided 
into subgroups. These sub-groups and their 
work are described in subsequent para- 
graphs. The initial thrust of this team has 
been directed toward those long-lead 
decisions required for the first flight; 
namely, an evaluation of the Trans-Atlantic 
Abort mode, participation in the flight de- 
sign process, and a review of the required 
flight software changes. The flight design 
baseline is now complete, and a report cit- 
ing the acceptability of the Trans-Atlantic 
Abort mode has been provided to the Pro- 
gram Manager. 
The Abort Mode Implementation subgroup 
has focused on the first flight activities. This 
group is reviewing the final submittal of 
flight software modifications, the certifica- 
tion history of the ascent abort modes, the 
verification process for both onboard and 
ground software, contingency procedures, 
and abort targeting. 
The Ascent Design subgroup is reviewing 
the ground rules and constraints that are 
used to shape the ascent trajectory, as well 
as the methods of predicting ascent perfor- 
mance margin. Flight product development 
processes and the verification of these 
products are also being reviewed. The tech- 
niques and procedures for assuring the abil- 
ity of the vehicle to perform in the ascent 
environment, as it is observed to exist on 
launch day, will also be assessed. 
The Systems Management subgroup is 
reviewing all vehicle systems and their oper- 
ational management. Issues uncovered dur- 
ing these review sessions are being resolved 
by the group, where possible, and, when re- 
quired, issues are fowarded to the appropri- 
ate level of management. Changes are being 
made to vehicle requirements, ground and 
flight documentation, flight rules, flight 
software, and where necessary, flight hard- 
ware changes are being proposed. 
The Range Safety subgroup, which also in- 
cludes Air Force personnel, will assure the 
adequacy of the tools, procedures, and rules 
for developing the proper blend of flight 
and ground safety during the ascent phase. 
The group is reviewing the Space Shuttle 
range safety hardware to evaluate the need 
for carrying destruct charges on both the 
External Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters. 
Other subgroups of this team are reviewing 
weather statistics and forecasting tools and 
techniques as they pertain to launch and 
landing operations. The process of imple- 
menting flight software products to meet 
flight requirements is also being reviewed. 
The Launch Commit Criteria and Flight 
Rule review groups have begun a systematic 
review of the decision making criteria used 
to commit a vehicle to launch and to govern 
the decision making processes used in 
flight. 
This LaunchIAbort Reassessment Team will 
review every aspect of the launch process 
and assure that when operations resume, 
they are as safe as possible. The Launch/ 
Abort study will be complete on October 1 ,  
1986, with an implementation decision in 
December 1986. 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
- VIII - 
Flight Rate. The nation’s reliance on the Shut- 
tle as its principal space launch capability created 
a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the 
flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch 
capability should be avoided in the future. 
NASA must establish a flight rate that is consis- 
tent with its resources. A firm payload assignment 
policy should be established. The policy should 
include rigorous controls on cargo manifest 
changes to limit the pressures such changes exert 
on schedules and crew training. 
NASA has formed a Flight Rate Capability Working Group to assess a safe, sustainable flight 
rate and to identify the constraints to this rate. The flight rate capability study will consider all 
required work for the standard vehicle processing flow and assure that the work is optimized in 
relation to the available workforce considering such factors as the manifest, nonscheduled 
work, in-flight anomaly resolution, mods, processing team workloads, and work balancing 
across shifts. The flight production study will review the requirements for mission planning, 
flight production development, payload assignment policy and controls and achievable soft- 
ware delivery capability to support flight controllers and crew training. These studies will 
consider the availability of the third Orbiter Processing Facility, the availability of spares, as well 
as the effects of supporting the Vandenberg Launch Site to determine the maximum achiev- 
able safe flight rate. 
A cargo manifest policy is being formulated by NASA Headquarters which will establish 
manifest groundrules and impose constraints to late changes. 
NASA supports increased emphasis on a mixed fleet and action to revitalize the United States 
expendable launch vehicle capability. 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation VI11 
The assessment of a safe sustainable NSTS 
flight rate capability was initiated in March 
1986 with the establishment of a formal 
Flight Rate Capability Working Group. This 
group includes representation from John- 
son Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, 
Marshall Space Flight Center, NASA Head- 
quarters, Vandenberg Launch Site and Air 
Force Space Division. 
Under the direction of this working group, 
flight rate capability studies are under way 
at Kennedy Space Center and Johnson 
Space Center. These studies will assess the 
best estimate of flight rate capability and 
will identify potential constraints to that 
rate. An integral part of the flight rate plan- 
ning mechanism will be the identification 
and implementation of program enhance- 
ments (facilities, manpower, support equip- 
ment, procedures, production improve- 
ments) required to achieve the flight rate. 
The flight rate assessment will also consider 
flight software development and design, crew 
training requirements, spares provision- 
ing, as well as maintenance and structural 
inspection requirements. Flight rate analy- 
ses tools and procedures that will support 
both accurate flight rate projection and 
detailed operations schedules at the Ken- 
nedy Space Center are planned. The Na- 
tional Research Council is conducting an 
I 
1 
assessment of the flight rate capability at the 
request of the Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agen- 
cies. NASA is supporting this analysis and 
will incorporate the results into the assess- 
ment of flight rate. 
NASA has participated in Senior Interag- 
ency Group discussions on overall United 
State space launch strategy. NASA supports 
increased emphasis on a mixed fleet and 
actions to revitalize the United States ex- 
pendable launch vehicle capabilities. 
A cargo manifest policy is being formulated 
by NASA Headquarters which will establish 
manifest ground rules and impose con- 
straints to late changes. Cargo manifest 
change control is being pursued through 
the generation of a set of manifest stability 
groundrules and policies which will apply to 
both NASA Headquarters and the program 
level. Proposals are being formulated at the 
Johnson Space Center for submission to 
NASA Headquarters in November 1986. In 
addition, manifest change impact prediction 
and measurement tools are being devel- 
oped. Integrated scheduling and resource 
prediction concepts have been defined and 
the necessary software programming initiat- 
ed. 
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE 
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 
RECOMMENDATION 
- IX - 
Maintenance Safeguards. Installation, test, and 
maintenance procedures must be especially 
rigorous for Space Shuttle items designated 
Criticality 1. NASA should establish a system of 
analyzing and reporting performance trends of 
such items. 
Maintenance procedures for such items should 
be specified in the Critical Items List, especially 
for those such as the liquid-fueled main engines, 
which require unstinting maintenance and another. 
overhaul. 
With regard to the Orbiters, NASA should: 
and execute a comprehensive 
maintenance inspection plan. 
Perform periodic structural inspections when 
scheduled and not permit them to be waived. 
Restore and support the maintenance and 
spare parts programs, and stop the practice of 
removing parts from one Orbiter to supply 
NASA is developing an NSTS Maintenance Plan to ensure that uniform maintenance 
requirements are imposed by all program elements. This plan will define inspection require- 
ments and frequency, periodic maintenance requirements and schedules, configuration con- 
trol requirements and organizational responsibility, and reporting requirements. All existing 
test and checkout requirements documents are being reviewed and will consider the results of 
the ongoing Critical Items List (CIL) reviews to ensure consistency between the CIL require- 
ments and Operations and Maintenance Instructions at the Kennedy Space Center and the 
Vandenburg Launch Site. NASA is actively reviewing its policy and future planning for pro- 
gram logistics including spare parts provisioning. 
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NASA Implementation of Recommendation IX 
The NSTS has established a Maintenance 
Safeguards Team with representatives from 
the Johnson (JSC), Kennedy (KSC), and 
Marshall (MSFC) Space Flight Centers to 
develop a comprehensive plan for defining 
and implementing actions in compliance 
with Presidential Commission Recommen- 
dation IX. This team will serve as the focal 
point for all the NSTS maintenance activity 
and will ensure that an adequate mainte- 
nance program is in place and well under- 
stood by all elements of the program. 
A National Space Transportation System 
Maintenance Plan is being prepared to en- 
sure that uniform maintenance require- 
ments are imposed by all elements of the 
NSTS Program. This plan will define the 
documentation and implementation re- 
quirements for (1) hardware inspections 
and schedules, (2) planned maintenance ac- 
tivities and schedules, (3) maintenance 
procedures configuration control, and (4) 
maintenance logistics. The plan will also de- 
fine organizational responsibilities, report- 
ing, and control requirements for NSTS 
maintenance activities. 
Maintenance requirements for checkout, 
tests, inspections, servicing, and repair will 
be validated for both vehicle processing and 
depot level repair activities. The effort for 
the vehicle processing activity is defined and 
scheduled after completion of the Failure 
Modes and Effects AnalysidCritical Items 
List Review currently under way. Planning 
for a Depot Level Repair Requirements 
Review has been initiated. The Operations 
Maintenance Requirement Specification 
Document (OMRSD) which defines all test 
and checkout requirements is being re- 
viewed to ensure that the requirements are 
complete and that the required testing is 
consistent with the results of the Critical 
Items List (CIL) review. 
Maintenance procedures used by the launch 
sites and repair agencies are being validated 
by technical teams including membership 
from the design centers and element con- 
tractors to ensure proper implementation 
of requirements. Verification of Shuttle ve- 
hicle checkout and processing procedures is 
currently being accomplished in the Opera- 
tions and Maintenance Instruction (OMI) 
review. An activity to establish methods to 
rigorously control baselined procedures for 
safety-related critical items and to obtain 
design center concurrence on any changes 
to these critical procedures is in place. 
The problem reporting and corrective ac- 
tion systems presently being used by JSC, 
KSC, and MSFC are being consolidated and 
reviewed for uniformity in documentation, 
reporting, and trend analyses requirements 
based on failure and process non- 
conformance experience. Safety, reliability, 
and quality assurance activities will be an in- 
tegral part of the NSTS Maintenance Pro- 
gram. These activities will be closely coordi- 
nated with the newly formed office of the 
Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliabil- 
ity, and Quality Assurance. 
Maintenance Inspection Plans are being de- 
veloped by each NSTS Project. The Space 
Shuttle Main Engine Project has a program 
approved inspection plan in place. This 
plan will be examined and its adequacy veri- 
fied. The Orbiter Project has submitted, for 
program baselining, an inspection plan 
resulting from studies done by a major air- 
line company. This plan establishes 
rigorous requirements, schedules, and a 
closed loop feedback mechanism for 
providing launch site inspection results to 
project personnel. Inspection plans for the 
External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster 
Projects are being developed. 
The logistics program for the Orbiter vehi- 
cle has been a concern of the program since 
the completion of developmental flights. 
The lack of sufficient spare parts led to 
practices such as removal of parts from one 
Orbiter to supply another. NASA has initi- 
ated an assessment of spare parts require- 
ments to adequately support the flight rate 
planning. Progress has been made with the 
construction of a large logistic facility at 
KSC in which all available parts can be sto- 
red. Additionally, the Orbiter Prime Con- 
tractor has established a Logistics Service 
Center near Kennedy Space Center which 
provides field maintenance capability for a 
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number of Orbiter subsystem elements. 
Contractual and government management 
changes have been made which will improve 
the logistics planning. Measurement criteria 
for monitoring the availability of spare 
parts are being developed and given proper 
attention by program management. A 
rigorous, closed-loop, accounting system 
that provides the discipline to assure com- 
pliance with all program approved check- 
out, tests, inspections, servicing, and repair 
requirements is being established. 
Appendix A 
March 24, 1986 Memorandum from the Associate Administrator for Space Flight: 
Strategy for Safely Returning the Space Shuttle to Flight Status ! 
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National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washing ton. D. C. 
20546 
Reply to Attn of: M 
TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
MAR 2 4  1986 
D i s t r i b u t i o n  
M/Associate Administrator f o r  Space F1 i g h t  
Strategy f o r  Safely Returning the Space Shut t le  t o  F l i g h t  
Status 
This  memorandum def ines the  comprehensive s t ra tegy and major act ions 
that ,  when completed, w i l l  allow resumption o f  the  NSTS f l i g h t  
schedule. NASA Headquarters ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  the O f f i c e  o f  Space F1 i g h t ) ,  
the OSF centers, the  National Space Transportat ion System (NSTS) 
program organizat ion and i t s  various contractors  w i l l  use t h i s  guidance 
t o  proceed with the r e a l i s t i c ,  p r a c t i c a l  act ions necessary t o  r e t u r n  t o  
the NSTS f l i g h t  schedule w i th  emphasis on f l i g h t  safety.  This guidance 
i s  intended t o  d i r e c t  planning f o r  the  f i r s t  year o f  f l i g h t  wh i le  
p u t t i n g  i n t o  motion those a c t i v i t i e s  requi red t o  es tab l i sh  a r e a l  i s t i c  
and an achievable launch r a t e  t h a t  w i l l  be sa fe l y  sustainable. We 
in tend t o  move as qu ick l y  as p rac t icab le  t o  complete these act ions and 
r e t u r n  t o  safe and e f f e c t i v e  operat ion of the  Nat ional  Space 
Transportat ion System. 
Guidance f o r  the fo l low ing  subjects i s  included: 
o 
o FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 
o DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 
ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT 
ACTIONS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT: 
Reassess E n t i r e  Program Management St ructure and Operation 
The NSTS program management philosophy, s t ructure,  repor t ing  channels 
and decision-making process w i l l  be thoroughly reviewed and those 
changes implemented which are requi red t o  assure confidence and sa fe ty  
i n  the  ove ra l l  program, inc lud ing the  commit t o  launch process. 
Add i t iona l l y ,  the Level I / I I / I I I  budget and management re la t i onsh ips  
w i l l  be reviewed t o  insure that  they do no t  adversely a f fec t  the  NSTS 
dec is ion process. 
25th Anniversary 
1958-1983 
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Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Joint Redesign 
A dedicated SRM joint design group will be established at MSFC, with 
selective participation from other NASA centers and external 
organizations, to recommend a program plan to quantify the SRM joints 
problem and to accomplish the SRM joints redesign. 
reviewed in detail by the program to include PDR, CDR, DCR, independent 
analysis, DM-QM testing, and any other factors necessary to assure that 
the overall SRM is safe t o  commit to launch. 
post-flight inspections for the redesigned joints and other flight 
components will be developed in detail, with criteria developed for 
commitment to the next  launch as well as reusability of the specific 
flight hardware components. 
The design must be 
The type and content of 
Desi an Reaui rements Reverification 
A review of the NSTS Design Requirements (Vol. 07700) will be conducted 
to insure that all systems design requirements are properly defined. 
This review will be followed by a delta DCR for all program elements to 
assure the individual projects are in compliance with the requirements. 
Complete CIL/OMI Review 
All Category 1 and 1R critical items will be subjected to a total 
review with a complete reapproval process implemented. Those items 
which are not revalidated by this review must be redesigned, certified, 
and qualified for flight. The review process will include a review of 
the OMI's, OMRSD's, and other supporting documentation which is 
pertinent to the test, checkout, or assembly process o f  the Category 1 
and 1R flight hardware. KSC will continue to be responsible for all 
OMI's with design center concurrence required for those which affect 
Category 1 and 1R items. 
reacceptance and to verify their proper categorization. 
Complete OMRSD Review 
The OMRSD will be reviewed to insure that the requirements defined in 
it are complete and that the required testing is consistent with the 
results of the CIL review. Inspection/retest requirements will be 
modified as necessary to assure flight safety. 
Category 2 and 3 CIL's will be reviewed for 
Launch/Abort Reassessment 
The launch and launch abort rules and philosophy will be assessed to 
assure that the launch and flight rules, range safety systems/ 
operational procedures, landing aids, runway configuration and length, 
performance vs. TAL exposure, abort weights, runway surface, and other 
landing related capabilities provide an acceptable margin of safety to 
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1 
the vehicle and crew. 
will be reviewed and improved where possible t o  allow fo r  the most 
accurate reporting. 
Additionally, the weather forecasting capabili ty 
FIRST FLIGHT/FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 
First F l i g h t  
The subject of f i r s t  f l i gh t  mission design will require extensive 
review t o  assure tha t  we are  proceeding i n  an orderly, conservative, 
safe manner. To permit the process t o  begin, the following specific 
p lanning  guidance applies t o  the f i rs t  planned mission: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
daylight KSC launch 
conservative f l i g h t  design t o  minimize TAL exposure 
repeat payload ( n o t  a new payload class)  
no waiver on landing weight 
conservative launch/launch abort/landing weather 
NASA-only f l i gh t  crew 
engine thrust within the experience base 
no active ascent/entry DTO's 
conservative mission rules 
early,  stable f l i gh t  p l a n  with supporting f l i g h t  software and 
t r a i  n i  n m  
daylight EDW landing (lakebed or runway 22)  
F i r s t  Year 
The planning for  the f l i g h t  schedule for  the f irst  year of operation 
will r e f l ec t  a launch ra te  consistent w i t h  t h i s  conservative approach. 
The specif ic  number o f  fl ights t o  be planned fo r  the f i r s t  year will be 
developed as soon as possible and will consider KSC and VAFB work flow, 
software development, controller/crew training, e tc .  Changes t o  f l i gh t  
plans, ascent t ra jec tor ies ,  manifest, e tc . ,  will be minimized i n  the 
in t e re s t  of program s t ab i l i t y .  
a f t e r  thorough review of the previous mission's SRM j o i n t  performance, 
a1 1 other specified c r i t i ca l  systems performance and resolution of 
anomalies. 
Decisions on each launch will be made 
I n  general, the f i r s t  year of operation will be maintained w i t h i n  the 
current f l i g h t  experience base, and any expansion of the base, 
including new classes of payloads, will be approved only a f t e r  very 
thorough safety review. Specifically, 109 percent thrust levels will 
not be flown until  satisfactory completion of the MPT tes t ing currently 
being planned, and the f i r s t  use of the Filament Wound Case will n o t  
occur w i t h  the f i r s t  use of 109 percent SSME thrust  level. 
e f fo r t  will be made to  conduct the f i r s t  VAFB f l i g h t  on a n  expeditious 
and safe  schedule which supports na t iona l  security requirements. 
Every 
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DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SAFE FLIGHT RATE 
The ultimate safe, sustainable flight rate, and the buildup to that 
rate, will be developed utilizing a "bottoms-up" approach in which all 
required work for the standard flow as defined in the OMRSD is 
identified and that work is optimized in relation to the available work 
force. Factors such as the manifest, nonscheduled work, in-flight 
anomaly resolution, mods, processing team work1 oads , work balancing 
across shifts, etc., will be considered, as well as timely mission 
planning, flight product development and achievable software delivery 
capability to support flight controllers and crew training. 
development will consider the availability of the third orbiter 
facility, the availability of spares, as well as the effects of 
supporting VAFB launch site operations. 
THE BOTTOM LINE 
This 
I 
The Associate Adminstrator for Space Flight 
reassessment of the NSTS proqram manaqement 
will take the action for 
structure. The NSTS 
Program Manager at Johnson Space Center is directed to initiate and 
coordinate all other actions required to implement this strategy for 
return to safe Shuttle flight. 
I know that the business of space flight can never be made to be 
totally risk-free, but this conservative return to operations will 
continue our strong NASA/Industry team effort to recover from the 
Challenger accident. 
at some level in our organizations, and I am fully aware of the 
tremendous amount of dedicated work which must be accomplished. 
know that our nation's future in space is dependent on the individuals 
who must carry this strategy out safely and successfully. Please give 
this the widest possible distribution to your people. 
must understand it, and they who must do it. 
Many of these items have already been initiated 
I do 
It is they who 
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NASA memoranda directing the implementation of the Presidential Commission on the 
Space Shuttle Accident Recommendations 
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National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
Washington, D.C. 
20546 
Office of the Administrator 3 u W  2 0  1986 
TO: M/Associate Administrator f o r  Space F l i g h t  
FROM: A/Admi n i s tr a t  or 
SUBJECT: Pres ident ia l  Comnission Recommendations Act ion Plan 
The President has reviewed the r e p o r t  from the Commission on the Space 
Shu t t l e  CHALLENGER accident and on June 13 d i rected NASA t o  undertake a 
program t o  implement i t s  recomnendations as soon as possible. The 
President d i rected me t o  repo r t  t o  him i n  30 days on how and when the 
Commission's recomnendations w i l l  be implemented. This r e p o r t  should 
include milestones by which progress i n  the implementations process can be 
measured. 
The O f f i c e  o f  the Administrator assumes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  recommendation 
number 4 on safety  organization. 
establishment o f  the O f f i c e  o f  Safety, R e l i a b i l i t y ,  and Q u a l i t y  Assurance 
t o  answer t h i s  recomnendation. The Of f ice o f  Space F l i g h t  i s  d i rected t o  
take the act ion f o r  a l l  other Comnission recomnendations and t o  prepare 
the NASA repo r t  t o  the  President. 
I have prev ious ly  announced NASA's 
I plan t o  repo r t  t o  the President on July 11, 1986. Please status me on & r---tc;;ra weekly basis. 
PREcEMHa PAGE BUNK NOT FILMED 
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NASA HEADQUARTERS - ROUTINE 
I 
UNCLASSIFIED 
. - 
RICHARD H. TRULY I 453-1132 
TUIS SPACE PDR USE OF CONMUNIU TlON UNIT 
M€ssAGE 10 BE RANSMIITB) f U U h &  sm.im#nJ.u4 
To: 
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 
iOUSTON, TX 
4TTN: GA/MR. A. ALDRICH 
9TTN: AA/MR. 3. MOORE 
(ENNEDY SPACE CENTER 
CENNEDY SPACE CENTER, FL 
RTTN: CDIMR. R. SMITH 
qARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, AL 
ATTN: DAOl/DR. LUCAS 
NATIONAL SPACE TECHNOLOGY LABORATORIES 
NSTL STATION, MS 
ATTN: AAOO/MR. I. HLASS 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
W 
UNCLASSIFIED 
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mloN I ROUTINE I UNCLASSIFIED NASA HEADQUARTERS 
lwIL 
Acc0Wmw-m MlI clb*g 111l 
MAA 6/13/86 
RICHARD H. TRULY 
F o R ~ ~ c A u  
MAM manwvrv mot- 
~ ~ A C @ p D l z u S e o P C ~ U V I G 4 ~ ~  
Mlum6 
453-1 132 0- 0- a ADDmss 
I N  A MEETING TODAY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE NASA ADMINISTRATOR, 
PRESIDENT REAGAN DIRECTED THAT A PROGRAM BE UNDERTAKEN TO IMPLEMENT 
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION RECOWENDATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 
THE PROCEDURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES SUGGESTED I N  THE REPORT WILL 
BE ESSENTIAL TO RESUMING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SPACE TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM OPERATIONS, AND WILL BE CRUCIAL I N  RESTORING U.S. SPACE LAUNCH 
A C T I V I T I E S  TO FULL OPERATIONAL STATUS. 
NASA WILL REPORT BACK TO THE PRESIDENT I N  30 DAYS ON HOW AND WHEN THE 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED INCLUDING MILESTONES BY 
WHICH PROGRESS CAN BE MEASURED. 
S P E C I F I C  DIRECTION REGARDING THOSE ACTIONS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT EACH 
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION WILL BE FORTHCOMING WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL 
DAYS. 
ADMINISTRATOR. 
RECOWENDATION 4 (SAFETY ORGANIZATION) WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE 
RECOMMENDATION 2 (SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTU 
n 
3 UNCLASSIFIED 
--14 M.r.lr- mlYCICYcJY Iclm 
M8m 1140 
bSA eMu (41 err) lo145306 * U.S. PRIWTIWG OFFICE : 1983 0 - 381-526 (8273) 
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UNCLASSIFIED I NASA HEADQUARTERS *L110)(, ROUTINE 
3 ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR 
FOR SPACE FLIGHT 
TO. 
ASTRONAUTS I N  MANAGEMENT, SHUTTLE SAFETY PANEL) AND RECOMMENDATION 5 
(IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS) WILL BE ADDRESSED BY LEVEL I. 
RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE WORKED THROUGH LEVEL 11, NSTS PROGRAM MANAGER. 
ALL OTHER 
3 UNCLASSIFIED 
THE STS 51-L TASK FORCE ACTION CENTER I S  HEREBY REDESIGNATED THE NSTS 
ACTION CENTER. 
COORDINATE AND TRACK THE PROGRESS OF EACH OF OUR ACTIONS AND TO BE THE 
NSTS POINT OF CONTACT FOR ORGANIZATIONS EXTERNAL TO THE NSTS RELATING 
TO THE COMMISSION REPORT. 
I INTEND THAT THE NSTS ACTION CENTER SHALL BE USED TO 
AS PRESIDENT REAGAN STATED TODAY I N  H I S  LETTER TO DR. FLETCHER, 
"...THE MEN AND WOMEN OF NASA AND THE TASKS THEY SO ABLY PERFORM ARE 
ESSENTIAL TO THE NATION I F  WE ARE TO RETAIN OUR LEADERSHIP I N  THE 
PURSUIT OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND S C I E N T I F I C  PROGRESS." DR. FLETCHER AND I 
HAVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE I N  OUR A B I L I T Y  TO ORGANIZE OUR RESPONSE TO 
THE ROGERS COMMISSION REPORT AND TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO RETURN TO 
A SAFE FLIGHT STATUS. 
-aAmnu 
I M W L  Inmaror .  
w 
hr*r-Iy. w w v  IC# 
* U.S. GOVERNIIMT PRINTING OFFICE : 1983 0 - 381-526 (8273)  
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M Reply to Attn of. 
TO: Johnson Space Center 
Attn:  GA/Manager, NSTS Of f i ce  
FROM: M/Associate Administrator f o r  Space F l i g h t  
SUBJECT: Implementation o f  Pres ident ia l  Commission Recommendations 
This d i r e c t i o n  ampl i f ies  my TWX o f  June 13, 1986, same subject. You are 
hereby assigned r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the ac t ion  associated w i t h  the  Pres ident ia l  
Commission Recommendations I, 111, V I ,  V I I ,  V I I I ,  and I X .  I n  f u l f i l l i n g  these 
actions, you w i l l  be responsible d i r e c t l y  t o  the  Associate Administrator f o r  
Space F1 igh t .  
Spec i f i c  act ions requi red f o r  each recommendation are enclosed. 
develop a repo r t i ng  p lan t h a t  provides me regular  v i s i b i l i t y  i n t o  the  s tatus 
o f  a l l  act ions. 
Center. My po in t  o f  contact  i s  M r .  J. Honeycutt, FTS 453-1261. 
You should 
Act ion s tatus w i l l  be routed through the NSTS Act ion 
I n  order t o  support the Admin is t ra tor 's  i n i t i a l  repo r t  t o  the President, your 
f i r s t  s ta tus i s  required no t  l a t e r  than Ju l y  3, 1986. 
453-1125, i s  my po in t  o f  contact  t o  develop t h i s  repor t .  
w i t h  him t o  reach an agreement on format and content o f  the  po r t i on  which 
concerns your act ions. 
Mr .  D. Branscome, FTS 
Please work d i r e c t l y  
This  work i s  o f  the utmost importance t o  re tu rn  the U.S. sa fe l y  t o  manned 
space f l i g h t .  
the  work associated w i t h  these actions. 
I t s  importance cannot be overstressed t o  those who accomplish 
Enclosure 
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M Reply to Attn of. 
TO: M/Robert L. Crippen 
FROM: M/Associate Administrator f o r  Space F l i g h t  
SUBJECT: Implementation o f  Pres ident ia l  Commission Recommendations 
This d i rec t i on  ampl i f ies  my TWX o f  June 13, 1986, same subject. 
hereby assigned r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the ac t ion  associated w i t h  the Pres ident ia l  
Commission Recommendations I 1  and V. I n  f u l f i l l i n g  these actions, you w i l l  be 
responsible d i r e c t l y  t o  the Associate Administrator f o r  Space F l i g h t .  
You are 
Spec i f i c  act ions requ i red  f o r  each recommendation are enclosed. 
develop a repo r t i ng  p lan t h a t  provides me regu la r  v i s i b i l i t y  i n t o  the s ta tus  
o f  a l l  actions. 
Center. My p o i n t  o f  contact  i s  M r .  J. Honeycutt, FTS 453-1261. 
You should 
Act ion s tatus w i l l  be routed through the  NSTS Act ion 
I n  order to  support t h e  Administrator 's i n i t i a l  r e p o r t  t o  the  President, your 
f i r s t  status i s  requi red not l a t e r  than J u l y  3, 1986. Mr .  D. Branscome, FTS 
453-1125, i s  my po in t  o f  contact t o  develop t h i s  repor t .  
w i t h  him t o  reach an agreement on format and content o f  the p o r t i o n  which 
conerns your act ions. 
Please work d i r e c t l y  
This  work i s  o f  the utmost importance t o  r e t u r n  the U.S. s a f e l y  t o  manned 
space f l i g h t .  
the  work associated w i t h  these actions. 
I t s  importance cannot be overstressed t o  those who accomplish 
Enclosure 
Abbendix C 
NASA letter to the Office of Personnel Management on revitalization of NASA through 
concepts contained in the President’s proposed Civil Service Simplification Act 
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Office of the Administrator JUL 1 0  &I6 
H o n o r a b l e  C o n s t a n c e  H o r n e r  
D i r e c t o r ,  O f f i c e  of  P e r s o n n e l  
1900  E S t r e e t ,  N W  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  DC 2 0 4 1 5  
Management  
Dear Mrs. H o r n e r :  
We a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  o f f e r  you  made i n  t h e  J u n e  1 3 ,  1 9 8 6 ,  m e e t i n g  
w i t h  D r .  F l e t c h e r  a n d  m y s e l f  t o  h e l p  i n  r e v i t a l i z i n g  N A S A .  The  
t i m i n g  c o u l d  n o t  b e  b e t t e r  f o r  us t o  e x p l o r e  j o i n t l y  i n n o v a t i v e  
ways  t o  manage  N A S A  p e r s o n n e l  m a t t e r s .  
S i n c e  o u r  i n i t i a l  m e e t i n g ,  we h a v e  t a k e n  s t e p s  t o  w o r k  w i t h  
y o u r  o f f i c e  t o  d e v e l o p  a n  a p p r o a c h  t o  i m p l e m e n t  t h e  c o n c e p t s  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  p r o p o s e d  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  
S i m p l i f i c a t i o n  Act ,  w i t h  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  b o t h  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
and  t h e  C o n g r e s s .  G a i n i n g  t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  t o  b e t t e r  c h a l l e n g e  
a n d  r e w a r d  o u r  p e r s o n n e l  w o u l d  g r e a t l y  h e l p  N A S A ' s  e f f o r t  t o  move 
f o r w a r d .  
We p l a n  t o  work w i t h  y o u r  s t a f f  t o  r e f i n e  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  and  
k e e p  t h e  p r o j e c t  mov ing  o n  a v e r y  f a s t  t r a c k .  
Your  c o n t i n u e d  e f f o r t s  i n  p a r t n e r s h i p  w i t h  N A S A  w i l l  b e  v i t a l  
t o  o u r  success .  
W i l l i a m  R. Graham 
D e p u t y  A d m i n i s t r a t o r  
